The Superior Court of Electoral Justice (TSJE) has consistently shown interest in integrating information and communication technologies (ICTs) into electoral processes since the early 2000s. From the use of rented electronic voting machines to the development of the Preliminary Electoral Results Transmission System (TREP)1, there are numerous examples of the main Paraguayan electoral body’s sustained interest in technology.
Simultaneously, the adoption of electoral technology has faced resistance from various groups within society who argue that there are insufficient guarantees for its implementation. A recent example of this opposition was the massive protests by supporters of the Cruzada Nacional party and other opposition parties against the results of the 2023 general elections. These parties rejected the presidential results, alleging electoral fraud through the electronic voting machines used in Paraguay since 2021.
In this context, the TSJE recently presented a package of electoral reforms that includes several important proposals, aiming to link these reforms with other ongoing election-related processes. We believe it is essential to reflect on the evolution of the electoral system and its intersection with ICTs to build on established processes and strengthen trust in the Paraguayan electoral system.
A Technical Electoral Reform?
The TSJE recently presented an electoral reform document proposing a series of technical adjustments to the current Electoral Code, in preparation for the 2026 municipal elections. Among the main proposals are ensuring greater independence of polling station members from political parties, providing them with remuneration, and enhancing the independence of judges and prosecutors. Additionally, the reform suggests extending the electoral period to 170 days, along with other changes reflected in over 200 articles.
From TEDIC, we positively value the electoral authority’s efforts to address operational issues within the electoral process, identified jointly with various political parties. As a result, we have analyzed several articles of the reform that directly relate to two investigations carried out by TEDIC, which document the specific interactions of voters with electronic voting machines in the 2021 municipal elections in Asunción and the 2023 general elections in Asunción and Ciudad del Este. The following table presents an analysis of certain articles of the reform and aspects that connect with our findings, which require attention from the TSJE and the legislators who will address this reform in the legislative session.
| Article in Electoral Reform | Findings in TEDIC Investigations |
| Article 104: Voting booths are spaces reserved to guarantee the secrecy of the vote. Technical specifications will be established by the Electoral Justice. | Usability surveys conducted in Asunción (2021 and 2023) and Ciudad del Este (2023) show that, on average, more than 20% of the electorate in Asunción and Ciudad del Este do not feel that the voting booth provided sufficient security for free and secret voting. In Ciudad del Este, for the 2023 general elections, this concern was as high as 29.9%. Therefore, it is important that electoral authorities set a high-security standard to ensure the secrecy of the vote. This also relates to the percentages of voters who entered the voting booth accompanied, invoking the assisted voting figure. While this practice decreased significantly in Asunción between 2021 and 2023, according to our survey, it remained notably high in Ciudad del Este during the 2023 general elections, with 7.4% of the electorate entering accompanied. |
| Article 118: The Superior Court of Electoral Justice (TSJE) is responsible for determining the maximum number of voters that will appear on the register for each polling station. | This is an important issue to address. In Asunción, both in the municipal elections (93.9%) and the general elections (97%), voters reported that they only voted on the machines assigned to their respective polling stations. However, in Ciudad del Este during the 2023 general elections, 9.3% of voters indicated that people from different stations came to vote at their stations and thus used electronic voting machines that did not correspond to them. This situation could negatively impact the maximum number of voters per station and result in the annulment of several stations since if more ballots are found than voters assigned to a station, that station is annulled. |
| Article 184: Responsibilities of polling station members Article 196: On election day, electoral delegates may set up information points at polling stations to help voters locate their positions on the registers. This task will be conducted under the control of the political associations participating in the elections. | While Article 184 extensively describes the responsibilities of polling station members, one of which is verifying the polling area to ensure the voter can cast their vote securely (linked to Article 104), a key issue directly related to the current electronic voting system stands out. Specifically, polling station members must alert and guide voters on the correct way to control their vote. For the 2023 general elections, only 23.9% of voters in Asunción and 14% in Ciudad del Este did not verify their ballot correctly as suggested by the TSJE: visually and with the RFID reader. Similar numbers were observed for the 2021 municipal elections in Asunción. This contrasts with the high percentages of voters who mentioned that they were not alerted by polling station members about the importance of double-checking: 76.6% in Asunción and 83.1% in Ciudad del Este for the 2023 general elections. It is crucial that the TSJE addresses this discrepancy in how voters effectively control their vote expression, through greater guidance from polling station members. This approach could also be extended to Article 196, ensuring that voters receive clear and constant alerts about each step of the voting process with the machines, across different phases, to ensure that voters maintain the highest level of control over their vote expression. |
| Article 292: Propaganda containing messages that advocate: messages with personal, injurious, or defamatory references towards any citizen or attacks on public morality and good customs are absolutely prohibited. | It is essential that the TSJE take measures to mitigate violence and misinformation during elections, including the regulation of electoral propaganda. However, it is unclear whether these measures will apply only to websites, banners, posters, and official profiles of political parties on social media, or if they will also affect any individual profile. Moreover, it is crucial to clarify who will have the authority to determine if a message is prohibited: will it be a judge within the framework of due process, or will this responsibility fall directly on the TSJE? If the interpretation of these messages is solely in the hands of the TSJE, without appropriate judicial oversight, it could pose serious issues for freedom of expression. We recognize that misinformation and violence undermine the trust, participation, and integrity of elections and, ultimately, democracy. However, in our research on misinformation, we consider this a complex field. We believe it is crucial to stay within the framework of the right to freedom of expression, limiting intervention only to those types of speech not protected by this freedom, as established by Article 13.5 of the American Convention. According to this provision, the only speech excluded from protection are war propaganda, advocacy of national, racial, gender, or religious hatred, and incitement to violence. Maintaining this approach is essential to balancing the protection of democracy with respect for fundamental rights. Furthermore, it is suggested that protective and reparative measures to mitigate these practices should be addressed through civil and administrative courts rather than punitive measures. |
An Open Secret: The Implementation of Biometrics for Voter Control
Various news reports indicate renewed interest from the TSJE in implementing biometric data, specifically fingerprints, as part of the voter identity validation process. Although the current electoral reform text only proposes using identity cards to identify voters before voting, it is evident that discussions are ongoing between the TSJE and various political actors about implementing biometric validation as part of the identification process.
This is not new. The TSJE has shown continuous interest in implementing biometric identification systems since at least 2013. From TEDIC, we have repeatedly warned about the risks of these initiatives, which require the massive collection of sensitive data1, especially in a context where we still do not have a comprehensive data protection law2. In 2019, we extensively analyzed a legislative proposal in the Senate that amended Articles 98, 201, and 208 of Law 834/963, with the aim of implementing a facial biometric identification system in the voting process. At the time, we raised several concerns: What guarantees exist to prevent linking a voter’s identity with their vote? How is the constitutional right to vote secrecy protected? Are there safeguards to prevent manipulation and tampering of fingerprint and facial recognition copies intended for use by the TSJE? If the service to provide electronic voting machines is outsourced, will biometric reading devices also be leased from the private sector? Will they have access to the biometric database? How will the sale of biometric databases be prevented, as has happened with the identity card database? Will there be penalties for abuse by those responsible for these databases? What measures will be taken if biometric data is cloned?
The questions raised remain as relevant as in 2019 and should guide and limit any implementation of these systems by electoral authorities. The 2019 bill was ultimately postponed in the Senate, and in 2022 a similar proposal, titled “Regulating the application of fingerprint recognition in commissions,”4 resurfaced in the House of Representatives, where it was also postponed without debate in Congress.
Similarly, the TSJE has continued to insist on the need to implement biometrics. Between January and March 2023, amid electoral preparations, the idea of using fingerprint identification at polling stations was proposed. However, the TSJE decided to backtrack, arguing that this could hinder voter participation and slow down the voting process, as expressed by Minister César Rossel.
Senator Eduardo Nakayama, during a TSJE presentation at the conclusion of the electoral processes diploma at the National Congress, stated that the next step in electoral reforms involving technology should be the implementation of biometric voter control to prevent fraud.
At the meeting between the TSJE and TEDIC in August 2024, the TSJE expressed the need to implement biometric registration in elections. However, this proposal was not included in the version of the electoral reform presented to Congress this year, as they explained there was no political consensus on the matter. The TSJE plans to present this initiative separately from the series of technical proposals already submitted. Given this context, we believe it is essential for all stakeholders to continue closely monitoring the implementation process of biometric data, assessing both the proportionality and the necessity of handling such sensitive data. This oversight should be carried out with particular attention to the lack of adequate safeguards to ensure the protection of the rights of the individuals involved and their active participation in the elections.
More Digital Tools for Citizen Initiatives: New Forms of Participation or Exclusion?
Just five months into the government of Santiago Peña and the new National Congress, in January 2024, a list of nepotism cases within the State was made public. The list includes relatives of parliamentarians and high-ranking officials who have been hired or appointed to positions with high salaries. Notable cases include Montserrat Alliana, daughter of the Vice President, who, at 25 years old and without a university degree, holds a position with a salary exceeding 18,000,000 guaraníes (approximately 2,500 USD). Another case is Ronald Solinger, son of Deputy Germán Solinger (ANR), aged 33, with a salary of 35,000,000 guaraníes (approximately 5,000 USD) at the Binational Entity Yacyretá. Additionally, Elías Godoy, son of Deputy Roya Torres1, works as an advisor to his mother with a salary of 9,500,000 guaraníes (approximately 1,350 USD). Throughout the year, the list has grown, sparking an ongoing debate about transparency and ethics in public administration.
In February 2024, a group of citizens submitted a popular initiative to the National Congress to prohibit and penalize nepotism in public office, colloquially known as “Chau Nepotismo”. This proposal was channeled through a popular initiative, a constitutional right enabled by the TSJE following the amendment of the electoral and municipal organic law in 2022.
For collecting signatures for any popular initiative, since 2022, the TSJE has offered a portal where proposals can be shared, and the collected signatures can be publicly tracked, verifying the authenticity of the signatories’ identities before submitting the proposal to Congress. To identify supporters, their identity card number and IC are required, along with a captcha verification to ensure that a real person is completing the form.
To drive the “Chau Nepotismo” initiative, 61,217 signatures were gathered, exceeding the 48,321 required. During the process, the TSJE identified “minimal errors” related to IC input and mistakes in entering new identity card numbers with chips; moreover, at certain times, the system stopped receiving signatures due to maintenance. However, citizens reported the disappearance of 3,800 signatures from the digital platform during the collection.
At the conclusion of the diploma course on electoral processes held at the National Congress in July 2024, the TSJE shared some of the technical challenges of the electoral reform, specifically including the implementation of electronic identity by the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MITIC). This identity platform is proposed for future signature processes in popular initiatives, aiming to avoid the difficulties observed with the current platform.
Regarding this point, from TEDIC, we consider the MITIC electronic identity portal to be a significant public innovation that facilitates procedures but also becomes a database managing sensitive information, such as health data, police, and judicial records, among others. Our concern lies in how this integration will be implemented: whether access will be limited through the TSJE portal or if MITIC will also store this citizen information. Depending on the answer, it will be crucial to evaluate the security measures and protection of personal data integrity.
On the other hand, from an inclusion perspective, the current TSJE portal is not designed for people who do not have internet access or who rely solely on free applications like WhatsApp, which represents a large portion of the population. Incorporating a complex platform like MITIC’s could further affect the participation of vulnerable groups without access to technology. Since its implementation in 2017, the electronic identity portal has been used by 700,000 people, according to MITIC data from December 2023. However, this indicates that a significant portion of the population still does not use this system. If the proposal is implemented, there is a risk of widening the gap between those who use these platforms and those who do not, as technological solutions often fail to consider factors such as digital literacy levels or connectivity, potentially excluding many people from exercising their right to political participation.
Conspicuously Absent: Regulation of Electoral Propaganda on Social Media
In recent years, the TSJE has undertaken various actions to strengthen its ability to understand the dynamics of elections in digital environments, particularly on social media. One example is the signing of a cooperation agreement with the Electoral Tribunal of Panama last May, aimed at exchanging experiences and tools to promote the responsible and ethical use of technology in electoral processes. More recently, the President of the TSJE announced an upcoming agreement with several social media platforms to launch a campaign against misinformation and the misuse of artificial intelligence (AI) in electoral processes.
In line with this, in July 2024, the International Forum of the Mercosur Parliament was held in Paraguay, where topics such as misinformation, digital platforms, and electoral integrity were discussed, along with strategies to integrate AI into electoral processes as a tool in the fight against “virtual crimes.”
In August of the same year, Paraguay hosted the XVII Inter-American Meeting of Electoral Authorities (RAE) of the OAS. The TSJE, in addition to being a co-host, announced that it would assume the presidency of UNIORE next year. The meeting brought together 30 electoral organizations and 40 authorities to discuss topics such as artificial intelligence and its impact on democratic processes, political and digital violence, and their influence on elections. Among the topics addressed was the moderation of “problematic” content and the regulation of prohibited speech, such as hate speech. Additionally, in an interview in August this year, the President of the TSJE announced that they would offer an AI chatbot for citizens to make inquiries related to the elections.
However, a notably absent aspect in the current text of the electoral reform is the regulation of political campaigns on social media. These platforms have become a central space for political dispute, where irregularities occur, such as the indiscriminate use of personal data for various purposes. Through publications made during an intensive training process in Asunción and Ciudad del Este in 2023, aimed at journalists and civil society groups, we demonstrated the relevance of social media in various political campaigns. We found that several national and departmental candidates invest considerable sums of money in social media advertising without declaring these expenses in their financial statements, available in the National Observatory of Political Financing (ONAFIP).
In this regard, it is crucial that the TSJE considers the evidence collected by TEDIC in recent years, which highlights the importance of analyzing social media to understand the magnitude and reach of digital electoral campaigns in Paraguay. Without this attention, we risk delaying a comprehensive electoral reform for several years. Moreover, it is essential that any regulation of social media is carried out in a participatory manner, involving diverse stakeholders, to ensure balanced regulation that protects human rights online and avoids scenarios of content censorship, as has been observed in other countries in the region.
Winds of Change? The Urgency of a National Debate Among Multiple Stakeholders
For the past few months, opposition actors have expressed interest in a mixed voting system that would allow voters to use paper ballots to elect presidents, governors, and mayors, and electronic voting machines for councilors and parliamentarians. This proposal arises from the crisis following the 2023 general elections and the growing distrust towards the electronic voting system by political actors, due to a lack of real transparency in its implementation and auditing.
This interest has materialized in a bill presented by Senator Ever Villalba (PLRA), which would allow voters to exercise their right in the manner described above. While we welcome this first initiative from the legislative body to address underlying concerns about the electronic voting system in Paraguay, a topic that TEDIC has been advocating since 2018, it is important that this process be comprehensive and framed within a reform that involves various public institutions, political actors, organized civil society, academia, the private sector, and the technical community in the drafting and prioritization process.
Additionally, it is crucial that this discussion does not differentiate between the use of paper ballots or voting machines based on the elective positions. We must recognize the risks that machines present in the entire electoral system, especially in the voting phase, and not differentiate these risks based on the contested position. The value of the popular vote is equal for all elective positions, and it is fundamental to protect it in its entirety.
Recommendations
At TEDIC, we believe that a new phase is emerging in the development of our electoral system. In this context, and with the aim of strengthening the various discussions and debates currently taking place in parallel and without unified coordination, we believe that:
- A national committee should be established to evaluate the current text of the electoral reform and address the existing gaps, such as the lack of a regulatory approach to electoral propaganda on social media.
- The national committee should link discussions on electoral reform and address the real possibility of reversing the implementation of the electronic voting system, in an environment that allows for honest and participatory discussion on the subject. It is important that such a debate does not differentiate the use of paper ballots and voting machines based on single-member versus multi-member positions.
- It is important to abandon any initiatives that seek to implement digital biometric identification systems as part of the voter identification process.
- There should be a clear definition of the scope of the measures applied to speech during elections. It is especially recommended to ensure that any decision regarding the prohibition of messages is made under due process, by a competent authority, and in a manner that protects freedom of expression.
- A reflection on the use of MITIC’s digital identity as a validation instance for individuals wishing to participate in popular initiatives is necessary. The TSJE must seek a balance between technology and internet access to avoid exclusions from a constitutional right.
- An urgent need exists for comprehensive personal data protection legislation. The TSJE should support the comprehensive law that is still pending in Congress as a crucial step towards strengthening the control over the use of personal data in digital political campaigns.
We will closely follow the ongoing debates on this matter and continue to contribute with our research, with the aim of promoting evidence-based public policies.
Explore in depth all the research we have developed on “Technology and Elections” at:
| Name of the Research | Topic Addressed | Download Link |
|---|---|---|
| Electronic Voting in Light of Constitutional Law | Analysis of electronic voting from a constitutional perspective | Available in spanish |
| The Imprisonment of Democracy in a Black Box | Impact of electronic voting on transparency and democratic legitimacy | Available in spanish |
| Between Myth and Reality. A Constitutional Perspective | Discussion of myths and realities of electronic voting within the constitutional framework | Available in spanish |
| The Guarded Dictatorship. The Legitimacy Crisis | Analysis of the legitimacy crisis in electronic voting systems | Available in spanish |
| Single Electronic Ballot: Some Risks and How to Mitigate Them | Risks of the single electronic ballot and mitigation measures | Download link |
| Habeas Data and Fraudulent Affiliations Due to Misuse of Personal Data | Misuse of personal data in fraudulent affiliations and habeas data rights | Available in spanish |
| History of Electronic Voting in Paraguay (2000 to 2021) | Evolution of electronic voting in Paraguay | Available in spanish |
| Survey on the Use of Electronic Voting Machines in 2021 Elections | Use of electronic voting machines in the 2021 municipal elections | Available in spanish |
| Use of Electronic Voting Machines in the 2023 General Elections | Analysis of the use of machines in the 2023 general elections | Download link |
| Misinformation: Challenges in the Electoral Context of Paraguay | Challenges of misinformation in elections | Download link |
| Electoral Propaganda on Social Media Exists: Monitoring Electoral Spending in the 2021 Elections | Monitoring spending on social media propaganda during the 2021 elections | Available in spanish |
| PubliElectoral | Analysis of electoral advertising in Paraguay | Cooming soon |
| Digital Violence Against Women Politicians in Paraguay | Digital violence directed at women in politics | Cooming soon |
| Voter’s Guide – Tactical Tech | Practical guide for voters on the use of technology in elections | Available in spanish |
| Misrepresentation of Law 5777/16 – Freedom of Expression | Analysis of the interpretation of Law 5777/16 regarding freedom of expression | Download link |
| The Influence Industry in Paraguayan Elections | Study of the influence of the digital industry in elections | Download link |
Footnotes:
1Personal data differs from sensitive personal data, as the latter refers to racial or ethnic origins, political preferences, religious, philosophical, or moral beliefs; participation or affiliation in a trade union or political organization; information related to health, sexual preference or life, biometric and genetic data linked to a physical person, and, in general, data that may foster unlawful or arbitrary prejudice and discrimination. More information here: https://www.tedic.org/lanzamiento-nuevo-fanzine-para-la-campana-mis-datos-mis-derechos-por-una-ley-integral-de-proteccion-de-datos-personales/
2Currently, the personal data protection bill presented by the Personal Data Coalition, of which TEDIC is a part, is pending review in the House of Representatives. More information here: https://www.datospersonales.org.py/
3Presented by Senators Fidel Zavala, Stephan Rasmussen, Patrick Kemper, Gilberto Apuril, and Georgia María Arrúa
4Presented by Deputies Rocio Abed, Esmerita Sánchez, Basilio Núñez, and Justo Zacarías.
1A system that streamlines the process of transmitting vote count results from the various polling stations across the country.
Analysis of the Budapest Cybercrime Convention in the Paraguayan criminal system