

Derechos Digitales, TEDIC, IPANDETEC and Karisma Foundation

**Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression:
Thematic report on “Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age”**

Threats and challenges to freedom of expression during elections in Latin American Countries

Jan, 2025

Introduction

In this report, we present a summary of the threats and challenges faced by the exercise of freedom of expression in electoral contexts in Latin American countries. This report provides specific information that can be expanded upon in future exchanges, which may be sent to the following email addresses: maricarmen@tedic.org, paloma.lara.castro@derechosdigitales.org

1. Threats

1.1. GenAI and Deepfakes affecting women candidates

It has recently been documented by S. Kapoor and A. Narayanan in a report on the impact of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) on 78 elections held in 2024 that this technology did not significantly exacerbate or amplify the spread of disinformation in those contexts.¹

Their study concludes that while the use of generative AI lowers the costs of creating content that deceives, misinforms, or lies, it does not inherently reduce the high costs associated with distributing disinformation. For the researchers, this represents a critical "bottleneck" for influence operations carried out by those seeking such services.

¹ Kapoor, S., Narayanan, A. (2024, December 13). Political Misinformation is not an AI problem. We looked at 78 election deepfakes. <https://knightcolumbia.org/blog/we-looked-at-78-election-deepfakes-political-misinformation-is-not-an-ai-problem>

Even though it is not possible to determine with certainty that the use of GenAI exacerbates disinformation in electoral contexts, *its application remains deeply problematic from a gender perspective*. During electoral campaigns, this technology has been non-consensually employed to impersonate female candidates, undermining their campaigns by attacking, deceiving, or spreading false information about their personal lives.

Such was the case of a **Mexican** candidate for governor of the state of Morelos, where a fake video was disseminated impersonating her image and voice, delivering an intimidating message to voters, which was later reproduced by the official local press², and another case involved a female candidate whose voice was cloned to create an audio message urging her supporters to vote for another candidate³.

It also occurred in the case of a **Paraguayan** congresswomen who, during a municipal election, had her voice impersonated through the use of GenAI. This technology was used to create a fake message in which she allegedly informed her voters, prior to the official count, that she had lost the race and was preparing a statement to announce her defeat.⁴

In the case of the recent elections in **Brazil**, where the presence of female candidates running for public office is still scarce, a case was identified involving a female mayor of the Municipality of Bauru who was a victim of a deepfake of images depicting her naked, which were circulated during her re-election campaign⁵. Another case involved a female candidate for Mayor of Rio de Janeiro whose image was manipulated in videos allegedly showing her engaging in sexual activity and nudity, which was used to attack her electoral campaign at the time⁶.

1.2 Online Gender-Based Violence Against Women Candidates

Connected to the above, women in politics face disproportionate levels of online harassment, often aimed at silencing their voices and discrediting their campaigns. This form of violence not only infringes on their rights but also weakens democratic participation by discouraging women's involvement in public life.

The consequences of this type of violence include psychological distress, with high levels of fear, stress and anxiety that undermine their quality of life. Women in politics fear most that digital violence could escalate into attacks on their physical integrity and safety, forcing them to live in a constant state of alert. This fear leads to self-censorship, a response to online

² El Sabueso (2024). Audio atribuido a Margarita González sobre programas sociales en Morelos tiene indicios de manipulación digital.

<https://www.animalpolitico.com/verificacion-de-hechos/desinformacion/audio-candidata-morena-margarita>

³ Wired (2024). Deepfakes, clonación de voz y descontextualización: la desinformación enturbia las campañas electorales en México.

<https://es.wired.com/articulos/elecciones-en-mexico-deepfakes-clonacion-de-voz-y-descontextualizacion-la-desinformacion-en-el-proceso-electoral>

⁴ Ciencias del Sur (2024). Inteligencia artificial y deepfakes: la nueva era de la desinformación.

<https://cienciasdelsur.com/2024/10/22/inteligencia-artificial-deepfakes-paraguay-era-desinformacion/>

⁵ Folha de São Paulo (2024). Prefeita de Bauru +e vítima de deepfake com imagem forjada em que aparece nua.

In:<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/painel/2024/09/prefeita-de-bauru-e-vitima-de-deepfake-com-imagem-forjada-em-que-aparece-nua.shtml>

⁶ Folha de São Paulo (2024). Tabata registra queixa-crime na Justiça por deepfake eleitoral com poses sensuais.

<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2024/09/tabata-registra-queixa-crime-na-justica-por-deepfake-eleitoral-com-poses-sensuais.shtml>

harassment that negatively impacts their right to freedom of expression and opinion⁷. In extreme cases, although not unusual, it can also lead to forced relocations, migration, exile, and suicide⁸.

A report from [Karisma Foundation](#) (a Colombian CSO advocating for digital rights) sponsored by UN Women was published in 2023 documenting the persistence of the gender gap in candidacies and political campaigns during the 2022 elections, a gap that is exacerbated by the violence experienced by female candidates online, particularly on social media. These platforms are spaces they cannot afford to leave without risking the weakening of their electoral campaigns.⁹

In this context, female candidates face various forms of violence aimed at discrediting their abilities and knowledge, reinforcing gender stereotypes, threatening their physical integrity, engaging in virtual harassment, and expressing discriminatory remarks, among others. This also includes "silencing," described by the candidates as an effort to silence them, carried out by individuals attempting to stop them from participating on social media and expressing their views¹⁰.

The report concludes, among other things, that female candidates often lack support from their own political parties to confront these types of phenomena. They also lack the tools and protocols to handle the personal effects of such experiences or their impact on their political careers.

A similar report crafted by [IPANDETEC](#) (a CSO from Panama focused on digital rights in Central America) in the context of the elections in Honduras and Costa Rica (2021-2022)¹¹ concluded that the female candidates most affected were those who were more exposed to the public environment or who participated in political spaces. These attacks often included personal details, rumors about their private lives, or judgments based on the actions of others, predominantly men.

With regard to the study on the Panamanian elections (2024),¹² It was concluded that the type of digital political violence suffered by female candidates in the form of attacks targeting their political roles and direct aggression. Such violence can discourage political

⁷ Sequera & Cuevas (2024). Technology-facilitated gender-based violence against women politicians in Paraguay. <https://www.tedic.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WEB.pdf>

⁸ Moolman, J. (2022). Freedom of Expression and Participation in Digital Spaces. UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/EP.14_Jan%20Moolman.pdf

⁹ Karisma Foundation (2023). Violencias digitales: otra barrera para que las mujeres participen en política. <https://web.karisma.org.co/las-violencias-digitales-pueden-disuadir-a-las-mujeres-de-postularse-a-cargos-publicos/>

¹⁰ Karisma Foundation (2024). Acoso, soledad y desprestigio. Un estudio sobre las formas, las rutas de atención y el impacto de las violencias digitales contra las candidatas al Congreso colombiano en 2022. <https://web.karisma.org.co/las-violencias-digitales-pueden-disuadir-a-las-mujeres-de-postularse-a-cargos-publicos/> see page 22

¹¹ Briancesco, M. (2022). Monitoreo de violencia política digital contra las mujeres, Honduras y Costa Rica 2021-2022. https://www.ipandetec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/MONITOREO-VIOLENCIA-DIGITAL-MUJERE_S.pdf see page 21

¹² Mow, W., Montenegro, A. (2024). Segur@s en Línea: Monitoreo de violencia política digital hacia candidatas a puestos de elección popular en las elecciones generales de Panamá 2024. <https://segurasenlinea.ipandetec.org/blog/segur-s-en-l%C3%ADnea-monitoreo-de-violencia-pol%C3%ADtica-digital-hacia-candidatas-a-puestos-de-elecci%C3%B3n-popular-en-las-elecciones-generales-de-panam%C3%A1-2024> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YzdbdHATa3kRBvXa2LrY_ljEAjeP_ROV/view See page 12

participation; some female candidates informed IPANDETEC of their intent to withdraw their candidacy due to the online abuse they endured during the electoral process.

1.3 Shrinking of the Civic Space

Another significant threat to freedom of expression during elections is the rise of so-called "anti-NGO laws," which reflect a troubling trend in Latin America. These laws are often accompanied by deceitful and hostile narratives that discredit civil society organizations (CSOs), portraying them as agents of foreign interests or associating them with illicit activities.

In **Paraguay**, the so-called "club law" imposes strict restrictions, such as detailed reporting of activities and funding, along with sanctions including the disqualification of members¹³. During its legislative process, false narratives about money laundering fueled the stigmatization of CSOs, even through the leaking of sensitive data from legislative bodies.

Similarly, in **Peru**, a proposed law would grant the Executive broad powers to sanction CSOs for alleged harm to public order, potentially leading to arbitrary control over these organizations¹⁴. In **Venezuela** the anti-NGO law was passed in 2024 and its content stifles civil society organizations with impossible requirements and stigmatizes the right to association as well as the right to defend human rights¹⁵. And in **Nicaragua**, which in 2022 approved the "General law for the regulation and control of non-profit organizations," restricting the right to association, limiting the creation of civil society organizations, and enabling the administrative cancellation of their legal status.

The impact of these laws and hostile narratives includes the stigmatization of CSOs, exposing their members to attacks and contributing to the shrinking of civic space. Ambiguous sanctions further exacerbate the issue, fostering self-censorship across various scenarios—especially during electoral periods, where the stakes are higher, and many CSOs intensify their scrutiny of current authorities and candidates competing for public office.

Additionally, financial restrictions and administrative burdens jeopardize the sustainability of these organizations, especially in contexts where local funding is limited. This situation undermines the independence of civil society and reinforces authoritarian tendencies, further constraining democratic freedoms.

In a global climate shaped by anti-globalist rhetoric and restrictive legislative developments, CSOs in Latin America face an increasingly uncertain future. The emergence of new legal initiatives aimed at curbing their work is likely to persist, further intensifying the challenges to defending human rights and reinforcing democratic principles in the region¹⁶.

¹³ TEDIC (2024) Year 2024 marked by the Anti-NGO Law in Paraguay: Major setbacks and concerns for democracy. <https://www.tedic.org/ley-anti-ong-en-paraguay/>

¹⁴ El País (2024). El control a las ONG en Perú, un zarpazo a la democracia. <https://elpais.com/planeta-futuro/red-de-expertos/2024-06-11/el-control-a-las-ong-en-peru-un-zarpazo-a-la-democracia.html>

¹⁵ Amnistía Internacional (2024). Venezuela: Aprobación de 'Ley anti-ONG' castiga la asistencia a víctimas y la defensa de los derechos humanos. <https://www.amnesty.org/es/latest/news/2024/08/venezuela-aprobacion-ley-anti-ong-castiga-asistencia-a-victimas-defensa-derechos-humanos/>

¹⁶ Linterna verde (2024) Vértices - Newsletter 19.12.2024. <https://us5.campaign-archive.com/?u=df9f4d2336d9fd96e8d039429&id=68a79e9103>

1.4 State-sponsored disinformation and state-platform collusion

State-sponsored disinformation and collusion with platform companies to control public narratives raises serious concerns about the government's control over the information ecosystem. This was flagged as a serious concern by the report on disinformation of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.¹⁷

One of the most representative cases of the spread of official disinformation in electoral contexts was during the presidency of Bolsonaro in Brazil. His anti-democratic rhetoric during the acknowledgment phase of his opponent, candidate Lula da Silva's victory, incited an attempted coup in the country in January, 2022. A recent judicial investigation into the coup attempt concluded that state-promoted disinformation played a pivotal role in orchestrating the events and was part of a coordinated information operation. Social media platforms failed to take decisive action to prevent it or to safeguard the integrity of the elections¹⁸.

2. Challenges

2.1. Lack of Data: A Barrier to Studying Disinformation

A significant challenge in addressing electoral disinformation is the lack of standardized methodologies to evaluate its impact on voter behavior, electoral outcomes, and democratic institutions. This gap hinders evidence-based policymaking and impedes efforts to design targeted interventions, leaving disinformation as an unchecked threat to electoral integrity.

Meanwhile, Meta, during an election year, announced in 2024 the deactivation of CrowdTangle, a tool that was crucial for researchers studying audience interactions on the platform and the virality of content. Although Meta replaced this tool with its Ad Library, access to it is highly qualified and restricted, limiting its use to individuals affiliated with academic institutions and non-profit organizations, effectively excluding journalists and independent researchers.¹⁹

And in January 2025, Meta announced²⁰ the dismantling of its fact-checking division to adopt a "community notes" model similar to that implemented by platform X. Under this new approach, previously established moderation policies will be reversed to "allow for more discourse," intervening only in cases of truly severe content, such as terrorism or child sexual exploitation.²¹ This shift threatens significant setbacks in efforts to advance information integrity, particularly during electoral periods when the flow of violent and misleading content intensifies due to political competition.

2.2. The decline of local journalism and its implications

¹⁷ OHCHR. 2021. Disinformation and freedom of opinion and expression. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g21/085/64/pdf/g2108564.pdf>

¹⁸ UOL (2024). Relatório mostra como era o processo de fabricação de fake news sobre urnas. In: <https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2024/11/26/organizacao-fake-news-plano-do-golpe.htm>

¹⁹ Linterna Verde (2024). Adiós a CrowdTangle: el nuevo panorama del acceso a datos en Facebook e Instagram. <https://www.linternaverde.org/blog/adios-a-crowdtangle-el-nuevo-panorama-del-acceso-a-datos-en-facebook-e-instagram>

²⁰ Meta (2025). More Speech and Fewer Mistakes. <https://about.fb.com/news/2025/01/meta-more-speech-fewer-mistakes/>

²¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clj74mpy8klo>

Evidence suggests that decline of local news outlets, especially newspapers,²² has led to reduced civic engagement, knowledge, and trust, which has contributed to the spread of disinformation. The cost of quality journalism and the industry's financial struggles present major challenges. The dominance of companies like Facebook and Google in advertising has further weakened the financial stability of independent journalism,²³ adversely affecting local media.²⁴

2.3. Growing “influence industries” and their opacity

According to Tactical Tech, an “influence industry” is “an industry of consultants, technology companies, and platforms. The role of the industry in politics is extensive, shrouded in mystery, and can have serious consequences for our political experience and consequently social and economic life.”²⁵ In Latin American countries, this industry thrives within a context of weak access to information laws, poorly enforced data protection frameworks, and ambiguous or inadequately monitored regulations on political party financing.²⁶

A cross-border investigation²⁷ conducted in 2023 by various media outlets and coordinated by the Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism (CLIP) revealed the complex network of consulting firms specialized in “winning elections at all costs.” This involves the intensive exploitation of population data, electoral manipulation, and the dissemination of false and misleading narratives and disinformation as a strategy to secure an advantageous or favorable position for the political candidate advised by these firms.

These business conglomerates operate across multiple countries in the region and function with little transparency.²⁸ Various reports produced by this investigative media alliance detail how the electoral regulations in Latin America, Spain, and the United States fail to adequately address the phenomenon of the influence industry, its disinformation operations, who finances them, and other related issues.

2.4 Platform business models and algorithms

The business model of online platforms, which thrives on the principles of attention economy and surveillance capitalism, incentivizes the amplification of harmful and illegal content, such as hate speech, disinformation, and extremist views, as they are more likely to elicit strong reactions from users.²⁹ In this environment, verified facts and reasoned debate take a backseat, as platform algorithms prioritize content that sparks outrage or conflict. This algorithmic tendency is exploited by bad actors, especially during elections, to skew the public discourse, shape narratives, scuttle truth, intimidate dissenters, and thereby create a polarized and hate-filled public sphere.³⁰

²² INN Index 2022: Enduring in Crisis, Surging in Local Communities,”Institute for Nonprofit News, July 27, 2022, <https://inn.org/research/inn-index/inn-index-2022/>

²³ <https://botpopuli.net/big-tech-and-news-media-in-india-the-frenemies-who-control-what-we-read/>

²⁴ Forbes (2021). Local news losing billions in revenue each year from Digital Media Giants- In: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2021/05/17/local-news-losing-billions-in-revenue-each-year-from-digital-media/?sh=5097927474f5>.

²⁵ The Influence Industry Project. <https://influenceindustry.org/en/project/about/>

²⁶ TEDIC & Tactical Tech (2024). The influence industry in Paraguayan elections. https://www.tedic.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/PolicyBrief-Tedic-TacticalTech_EN-web.pdf

²⁷ EI CLIP (2023). Mercenarios Digitales. <https://www.elclip.org/mercenarios-digitales/>

²⁸ EI CLIP (2023). Mercenarios Digitales. <https://www.elclip.org/mercenarios-digitales/>

²⁹ Vosoughi, Soroush et al. (2018). The Spread of True and False News Online. *Science*. <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aap9559> ; Zuboff, Shoshana. (2018). *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*.

³⁰ Paul Barrett, Justin Hendrix, and J. Grant Sims, “Fueling the Fire: How Social Media Intensifies U.S. Political Polarization — And What Can Be Done About It,” NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, September 13, 2021

Despite these challenges, platform regulatory laws have largely avoided directly addressing the underlying business models and techno-design architectures that perpetuate these issues. As the primary duty-bearers for human rights protection, states are responsible for addressing such violations, including those committed by third parties like corporations. Simultaneously, private actors have a responsibility to mitigate human rights violations linked to their operations. In this context, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights outline clear expectations for states and businesses, emphasizing the need for due diligence to ensure human rights are upheld, extending accountability to corporate business models themselves.

2.5 Efforts to regulate AI and Disinformation

The Superior Electoral Court (TSJE) of **Paraguay** has undertaken initiatives to strengthen electoral integrity in digital environments. Highlights include an agreement with the Electoral Tribunal of **Panama** to promote the ethical use of technology and an upcoming partnership with social media platforms to combat disinformation and the misuse of artificial intelligence (AI).³¹

Events such as the Mercosur Parliament Forum and the XVII Meeting of Electoral Authorities addressed issues like content moderation, regulation of hate speech, and the integration of AI in elections³². While these efforts are commendable, there is concern about regulating non-prohibited content, such as electoral disinformation, particularly regarding algorithm transparency, the role of tech companies, and the misuse of AI's impact on freedom of expression³³.

During the 2024 elections, **Panama** implemented the Digital Ethics Pact³⁴ a framework aimed at encouraging the responsible use of the internet and social media. The initiative sought to discourage dirty campaigning, the deployment of fake accounts and bots, and to promote ethical and accurate engagement on digital platforms.

In addition, the Panamanian Electoral Tribunal partnered with Meta to monitor digital advertising during the electoral process.³⁵ However, research conducted by El CLIP Centre revealed that the Electoral Tribunal reported several videos to Meta for violating electoral rules, seeking their removal. These videos, part of a coordinated operation to discredit various presidential candidates, included the use of artificial intelligence to falsify candidates' voices. Despite the tribunal's efforts, Meta did not suspend the reported publications.³⁶

While Latin America has yet to adopt significant regulations addressing the challenges posed by artificial intelligence in electoral contests, **Brazil** stands out with its recent progress

³¹ Verificado Contigo (2024). Organismos electorales de Panamá y Paraguay estrechan lazos de cooperación en materia de comunicación y estrategia digital.

<https://verificadocontigo.com/organismos-electorales-de-panama-y-paraguay-estrechan-lazos-de-cooperacion-en-materia-de-comunicacion-y-estrategia-digital/>

³² TEDIC. (2024) Towards a new electoral reform in Paraguay.

<https://www.tedic.org/en/towards-a-new-electoral-reform-in-paraguay/>

³³ Sequera (2023) Disinformation: challenges in the electoral context in Paraguay.

<https://www.tedic.org/en/disinformation-challenges-in-the-electoral-context-in-paraguay/>

³⁴ Tribunal Electoral, Pacto Ético Digital. <https://pactoeticodigital.com/>

³⁵ Telemetro (2024). El Tribunal Electoral mantiene intercambio de conocimientos con la empresa Meta.

<https://www.telemetro.com/nacionales/el-tribunal-electoral-mantiene-intercambio-conocimientos-la-em-presa-meta-n5978290>

³⁶ El CLIP (2024). Meta no reacciona ante operación de desinformación contra candidatos presidenciales panameños Lombana y Roux en sus redes.

<https://www.elclip.org/meta-operacion-desinformacion-candidatos-panama/>

on AI regulation. The AI Bill No. 2338/23³⁷, though its content deliberately recently passed its first stage of approval. However, the bill deliberately excludes references to disinformation or hate speech and their impact on electoral processes—issues that can be amplified by algorithms on content moderation platforms. This exclusion stems from the position of the bill's rapporteur, who argued that disinformation is not closely tied to AI regulation, despite clear connections between the two phenomena.³⁸

However, in February 2024, the Supreme Electoral Court of **Brazil** took a significant step by regulating the use of artificial intelligence in the creation of false content during election periods. The regulation mandates the disclosure of AI usage in electoral propaganda, restricts the use of bots for contacting voters, and assigns Big Tech companies the responsibility to remove disinformation content impacting elections. This includes hate speech, content promoting Nazi and fascist ideologies, anti-democratic narratives, and other harmful material.³⁹

The regulation of disinformation remains a challenge and in some cases violates the human rights of citizens. While there are no specific laws regulating disinformation in the Latin American region, some countries have included provisions against disinformation, fake news, hate speech, defamation campaigns, among others.⁴⁰

For example, **Nicaragua** has a special cybercrime law that dates back to 2020 and criminalises fake news. A recent amendment to that Law⁴¹ increases prison sentences for the dissemination or distribution of false or disinformation through information and communication technologies, extending its application both within and outside the national territory. The authorities in Nicaragua have massively arrested people for their online activities under Law No. 1042, stripping them of their Nicaraguan citizenship and deporting them to the United States, as documented in the Freedom on the Net report.⁴²

Laws that seek to regulate fake news or disinformation must be defined and aligned with international human rights standards to ensure that they are not used to silence and criminalise political opponents, candidates for public office, or other dissenters from the government.

Some recommendations on regulation:

- Platform regulation should require online platforms to move away from business models that incentivize disinformation, misinformation, and other forms of information manipulation.⁴³ This could be done through measures such as imposing a statutory duty of care on platform owners, periodic human rights risk assessment, and developing a liability framework to hold platforms and those directly in charge of its

³⁷ Derechos Digitales (2024). Regulación de la IA en Brasil: media sanción para un proyecto de ley que seguirá en discusión.

<https://www.derechosdigitales.org/24668/regulacion-de-la-ia-en-brasil-media-sancion-para-un-proyecto-o-de-ley-que-seguira-en-discusion/>

³⁸ Desinformante (2024). Nova versão do PL de IA retira os termos “desinformação” e “discurso de ódio”. <https://desinformante.com.br/pl-ia-desinformacao/>

³⁹ TSE proíbe uso de inteligência artificial para criar e propagar conteúdos falsos nas eleições.

<https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2024/Feveireiro/tse-proibe-uso-de-inteligencia-artificial-para-criar-e-propagar-conteudos-falsos-nas-eleicoes>

⁴⁰ LupaMundi, <https://lupa.uol.com.br/lupa-mapa-leis-desinformacao/>

⁴¹ https://www.poderjudicial.gob.ni/w2013/images-temp/Ley_1218_y_Ley_1219_Reformas.pdf

⁴² Freedom House. (2023) Freedom on the Net. C3.

<https://freedomhouse.org/country/nicaragua/freedom-net/2023>

⁴³ UN Global Principles for Information Integrity. (2024).

<https://www.un.org/en/information-integrity/global-principles>

business accountable for enabling or facilitating harms including disinformation, hate speech, incitement to violence, etc

- As the recent OECD Draft Recommendations on Information Integrity recommends: Governments should provide timely and reliable information on electoral processes to enable citizens to exercise their rights, with a focus on ensuring information is accessible to persons and groups who may be in vulnerable situations, including communities with limited access to technology. Further, governments should take steps to counter or prohibit the spread of disinformation and other forms of information manipulation that are designed and disseminated with the intent to obstruct or prevent citizens from exercising the right to vote or to disrupt the election process.⁴⁴
- Regulations should require greater transparency of political advertising. As the UN Global Principles on Information Integrity recommends, “Clearly identify and label all political advertising, including to indicate content that has been AI-generated or -mediated, and provide easily accessible information on why recipients are being targeted, who paid for the adverts and how much.”⁴⁵ Similar recommendations were made by the Draft OECD Recommendations as well.
- Governments should institute regulatory frameworks to hold AI developers, deployers, platforms carrying AI-generated content, and users accountable for threats to information integrity and democracy stemming from the deployment and use of AI.

About the contributors

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TEDIC is a nonprofit organization based in Paraguay that, since 2012, has been promoting and defending human rights in digital and technological environments, with a focus on gender, equity, and intersectionality. Its work has an impact not only nationally but also across the region. Website: <https://www.tedic.org/en/who-we-are/>

IPANDETEC It is a non-profit organization that promotes the use and regulation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and the defense of Human Rights in the digital environment in Central America and the Dominican Republic. Website: <https://www.ipandetec.org/>

Karisma Foundation is a Colombian civil society organization that seeks to guarantee the protection and promotion of human rights and social justice in relation to the design and use of digital technologies. Website: <https://web.karisma.org.co/>

⁴⁴ OECD (2024). Recommendation of the Council on Information Integrity. <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0505>

⁴⁵ UN Global Principles for Information Integrity, Recommendations for Multi-stakeholder Action. <https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un-global-principles-for-information-integrity-en.pdf>